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Third-Party Incentive Strategies and 
Conflict Management in Africa
Nikolas G. EmmaNuEl, PhD*
There is much to learn about the role of external actors in preventing violent conflict and managing it when it occurs. Consequently, this ar-ticle focuses on the possible range of third-party conflict-management tools, primarily through the lens of an incentives approach. Third-party 
incentives seek to manage conflict by facilitating bargaining between the parties 
involved. Such an approach tries to go beyond the purview of realist international 
relations scholars, who concentrate predominantly on hard power, by considering 
soft intervention options to alter the behavior of conflicting parties.1 Clearly, 
military intervention on the one hand or avoidance on the other hand cannot be 
justified in most cases. In between these extremes, a wide variety of alternatives 
exists. These options are referred to here as incentive strategies, which offer the 
possibility for much greater leverage than is often recognized.
Outside third parties (primarily states and international organizations but 
also individuals and nongovernmental entities) make use of different types of in-
centives to manage conflict. This article takes a look at their application generally 
but in particular regard to African cases. It examines how external actors use in-
centive strategies to promote changes in behavior by helping to bring about nego-
tiations and de-escalating intense internal conflict. The article argues that incen-
tives are critical in conflict management. It advances the point that noncoercive 
incentive strategies have a great deal of potential in relation to more aggressive 
actions because softer approaches frequently offer rewards without the resent-
ment and resistance that may come with more coercive efforts to alter behavior 
and manage conflict. To look more deeply into these issues, the article asks the 
following questions: What is an incentives approach to conflict management? 
*The author is an assistant professor at the Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts in the Depart-
ment of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. He is also affiliated with the Centre for Resolu-
tion of International Conflict. Professor Emmanuel holds a BA in political science from the University of 
California–San Diego; an MPhil in political science and African studies from the Institut d’Études Poli-
tiques and the Centre d’Études d’Afrique Noire in Bordeaux, France; and a PhD in political science from the 
University of California–Davis. His research is in the area of international relations and comparative politics 
with an emphasis on the use of soft-intervention strategies to facilitate changes in the behavior of various 
state and nonstate actors in Africa and beyond.
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What types of third-party incentive strategies are available? Can we draw any 
overarching generalizations about their utilization? By addressing these questions, 
the study seeks three practical goals: (1) to fill a gap in the relevant literature by 
exploring the theoretical basis for a use of incentives in conflict management, (2) 
to develop a typology of incentive strategies frequently used by external third-
party actors, and (3) to further the discussion about the advantages of noncoercive 
approaches vis-à-vis their coercive counterparts.
Incentive Strategies
An incentives approach consists of a variety of strategies or policy options 
that a third-party actor may use to encourage conflicting parties to adopt a peace-
ful solution by easing the process of bargaining and compromise. One should note 
that encouraging this shift in behavior away from violent conflict towards politi-
cal bargaining cannot occur only with hard power but must include soft power 
alternatives.2 That is, the rewards related to such soft intervention / noncoercive 
incentive strategies (compared with more coercive ones, such as diplomatic pres-
sures, sanctions, or military intervention) are generally viewed more favorably by 
the targeted actor(s) than are punishments. That is to say, “Conciliatory gestures 
frequently lead to cooperative responses, while threats often initiate spirals of 
hostility and defiance.”3 Incentives, especially noncoercive ones, lead to less local 
and international resentment than do more aggressive, coercive actions. Power is 
clearly much more complex than just military force. The manner and context in 
which it is employed matter immensely. Consequently, noncoercive incentive 
strategies have an underestimated potential to result in peace when compared 
with coercion and force.4
It may be obvious that to reach a peaceful outcome, the conflicting parties 
themselves must learn to resolve their differences. Nonetheless, outside third par-
ties can help push (or pull) them in the direction of peace. External actors can do 
so by using some of the incentives available to them. For all of their obvious po-
tential, incentives have received little attention from scholars and the policy-
making community. Instead, most of the reflection appears to concentrate on 
military intervention as the primary way to deal with civil conflict.
Additionally, one must emphasize that certain post–Cold War trends under-
score the importance of exploring third-party conflict-management options. Over 
the past quarter century, two important trends have emerged in regards to intra-
state war. First, such civil wars vastly outnumber interstate wars, and these internal 
conflicts tend to last longer.5 Second, although turned to frequently as a means of 
ending conflict, negotiated peace settlements appear to be more fragile in the 
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post–Cold War era than they were before this period.6 These facts concerning civil 
war in the recent past make it even more important to assess the role of third 
parties and their efforts to help bring an end to such conflicts. Incentive strategies 
hold out some hope or at least provide us with some options, but what is meant 
by “incentives” or “incentive strategies” or an “incentives approach” to conflict 
management?
Incentives consist of a variety of “structural arrangements, distributive or 
symbolic rewards or punishments (e.g. disincentives) aimed to encourage a target 
state or movement in a given conflict to shift their priorities and agree to compro-
mise on the major issues in contention.”7 Whether they are noncoercive or coer-
cive, related to soft or hard power, incentives attempt “to raise the opportunity 
cost of continuing on the previous course of action by changing the calculation of 
costs and benefits.”8 Put differently, according to Aaron Griffiths and Catherine 
Barnes, incentives are measures that “can be applied to encourage or persuade one 
or all of the parties to a conflict to cooperate by introducing rewards for compli-
ance.”9 Therefore, incentives are rewards or the offer of a reward. Yet, it would not 
have been offered had the “sender” not expected something from the “recipient”—
for instance, a particular kind of behavior.10 In line with this logic, David Cor-
tright, who analyzes how states use incentives towards other states, defines an 
incentive as “the granting of a political or economic benefit in exchange for a 
specified policy adjustment by the recipient nation.”11 Here, an incentive is the act 
of granting a benefit with a clear expectation of receiving something in return. For 
example, aid conditionality is one type of incentive.12 The overall objective of the 
incentives examined in this article has to do with managing conflict by facilitating 
bargaining relationships. These strategies can be used throughout the conflict cy-
cle. From the potential conflict stage through postconflict peace building, the goal 
remains the same—to encourage peaceful relations by making political bargain-
ing possible. Under such an approach, outside third parties offer some sort of 
benefit (or inflict some sort of punishment) to draw conflicting parties that are 
“sufficiently dissatisfied with their present costs . . . or future prospects” of warfare 
into a bargaining process.13 The goal of using incentives is to raise the costs of 
continuing down a path towards increasingly violent conflict.14 Third parties do so 
by expanding the benefits of abiding by the new rules of a more peaceful relation-
ship. However, one must remember that incentives can involve positive actions 
such as rewards (legitimation, aid, etc.) as well as disincentives or negative induce-
ments (punishment, threats, or coercion).
Situated between the options of doing nothing and taking military action is 
the choice of mediation, entailing the intervention of an outside third party (or 
parties) with the objective of assisting with bargaining between actors involved in 
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the conflict. In such action, incentives are important resources available to media-
tors in their efforts to move the behavior of the conflicting parties in a desired 
direction, providing the mediators with leverage over the parties. A mediator’s 
influence comes from his or her ability to facilitate an outcome that is minimally 
acceptable to both sides or that threatens a worse outcome.15 By using incentives, 
external mediators make adversaries aware of the benefits of a negotiated outcome 
while alerting them to the increasing costs of bargaining failure and to the pos-
sibility of a return to war.16 
Different levels of involvement and use of incentive strategies emerge, de-
pending on the nature of the conflict and the third parties’ level of perceived inter-
est. Certainly, in a large number of African conflicts, such as those in Mozam-
bique, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, third parties have used a 
variety of noncoercive means to keep open the channels of communication and 
supply information on the intentions of rival parties. At the next level, as in the 
Ethiopian/Eritrean War of 1998–2000 and Sudan and Liberia in 2003, mediators 
led by the United States have been more proactive, persuading and criticizing, 
giving advice, encouraging the parties to reconsider their options, and formulating 
proposals. Finally, in Somalia and briefly in Liberia in 2003, the United States 
combined diplomacy with (humanitarian) military intervention in an effort to 
promote a dialogue leading to conflict resolution.
Incentives involve a trade-off between interference and the advancement of 
peace and protection.17 These types of policy instruments are used to influence 
other people’s behavior. They do so by reducing uncertainty over the process lead-
ing to a peaceful resolution of conflict, helping to give credibility to the negotia-
tions that follow and easing uncertainty about their future intergroup relations.18 
Most importantly, outside third parties can use incentives that encourage certain 
outcomes over others. As Donald Rothchild indicates, “determined mediators 
need not passively wait for a ripe moment to emerge.”19 Incentives by external 
actors can advance “ripeness” for conflict resolution.20 For example, in the case of 
Sudan’s North-South conflict, US secretary of state Colin Powell repeatedly em-
phasized the applicability of the “mutually hurting stalemate” concept in his inter-
actions with the conflicting parties leading up to the signing of the Comprehen-
sive Peace Agreement in January 2005.21 Through the application of incentives 
and the firm use of diplomatic pressure, mediators clearly can help advance the 
ripening process in some instances. In other cases, however, they can force too 
rapid a pace and watch ripeness turn rotten, agreements fall apart, and conflicts 
reignite into violence—results that occur all too frequently.
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A Typology of Incentive Strategies
External third-party actors can help manage conflict in a variety of ways. 
They can use a wide spectrum of diplomatic, economic, and security options to 
de-escalate conflict once the spiral begins. This section highlights the main cate-
gories of an incentives approach, addressing their contributions to conflict man-
agement and resolution. These different incentive strategies can be arranged along 
a continuum from least to most coercive; however, the boundaries between differ-
ent modes of third-party involvement are not always distinct. Certain policy in-
struments overlap different modes of influence in the typology.
As depicted in the table and figure below, at one end of the spectrum are the 
least coercive (i.e., noncoercive) measures that can be implemented to shift the 
conflicting parties’ relationships towards more peaceful bargaining.22 These in-
clude purchase, insurance, legitimation, and economic support. At the other end 
of the force continuum, the most coercive measures include diplomatic pressure, a 
wide variety of sanctions, and different types of military intervention. Although 
these coercive features are present in these options, they should be considered 
incentives that attempt to bring about cooperation. That is to say, external actors 
using these policies are attempting to encourage the combatting factions to alter 
their calculations (costs and benefits) of continuing to escalate already tense rela-
tions. The overall goal involves making the adoption of more peaceful behavior 
favorable to participants in a given conflict.
Table. Summary of noncoercive and coercive incentive strategies
Noncoercive Incentive Strategies
Purchase Short-term fiscal rewards / side payments to shift behavior
Insurance Promises or guarantees to build politico-institutional pro-tections for disenfranchised groups
Legitimation Offer to be a regular participant in the international com-munity
Economic Support Provision of developmental aid to alleviate group griev-ances 
Coercive Incentive Strategies
Diplomatic pressure Partially coercive strategy; expressing concern about be-havior
Sanctions Punitive strategy designed to alter behavior; symbolic di-mension
Military Intervention Strategy used by a third party especially to strengthen political initiative; can decisively alter the balance of forces
Source: Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller, Africa-US Relations: Strategic Encounters (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
2006).
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Insurance
Purchase Legitimation Diplomatic Pressure
SanctionsEconomic
Support
Military
Intervention
CoerciveNoncoercive
Figure. Principal incentive strategies. (Based upon Donald Rothchild and Nikolas Emmanuel, “Soft intervention in Africa: US 
Efforts to Generate Support for Peace,” in Strengthening Peace in Post–Civil War States: Transforming Spoilers into Stakehold-
ers, ed. Matthew Hoddie and Caroline A. Hartzell [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010], 123–43.)
It is important to indicate at this point that incentive options are frequently 
applied together in packages. For example, in the case of the Machakos talks on 
the North-South civil war in Sudan, diplomatic pressure was combined with 
threats of deepening the sanctions regime on Khartoum to increase the costs of 
the target if it did not alter its preferences and continue the conflict. However, the 
choice of which incentive strategy to apply in any given case depends on a third 
party’s capacity, willingness to engage, and assessment of what will prove effective 
in de-escalating the conflict and advancing peace. Future research needs to exam-
ine this topic more closely.
Noncoercive Incentive Strategies
As Donald Rothchild and Nikolas Emmanuel indicate, noncoercive incentives 
are more likely to result in a durable peace; furthermore, if coercive methods are 
applied, one should follow up with foreign aid and encourage important political 
reforms like minority protections as a means of preventing a relapse of violence.23 
Note that, overall, the choice of incentive(s) is based on a diplomat’s perception of 
his or her country’s interests and the ability of his or her strategic approach to 
realize its desired purposes of conflict termination at a reasonable cost.24
Importantly, making overarching generalizations about the use of different 
foreign policy approaches—in this case, the use of incentives—is rather difficult. 
Each conflict has its own dynamics and specificities. That said, it is possible to put 
together a general road map that gleans vital information from previous uses of 
incentive strategies in conflict management. It is valuable to consider past experi-
ences to better inform possible incentive choices that may be relevant in each fu-
ture context. To explore these experiences and any potential generalizations, the 
remainder of this article examines each of the seven incentive strategies in more 
detail and then offers some general conclusions.
Purchase. A number of relatively low cost but sometimes quite effective 
means of facilitating cooperation are available. The noncoercive incentive strategy 
of purchase represents one of these options. Purchase refers to short-term, tangible 
fiscal rewards or side payments that can alter payoff structures and behavior to 
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help end conflict. Purchase differs from economic aid, which is much larger in 
terms of amount and scope. By offering such an option, the third party enlarges 
the pie in an effort to facilitate the possibility of reconciliation. It alters the payoff 
structure to transform a dispute from a constant-sum to a positive-sum game, 
thus enhancing the possibility of a compromise.25 More concretely, purchase can 
be used to make special arrangements with individuals or groups of individuals to 
encourage exit (i.e., leave the conflict). The hope is to eliminate the potential for 
spoilers that may undermine the move away from violent conflict.26
Such side payments or special deals to encourage an exit can be seen in the 
successful international effort to persuade former Ethiopian leader Mengistu 
Haile Mariam to leave Addis Ababa and depart for Zimbabwe in May 1991. 
Furthermore, this technique can provide short-term financing to rebel move-
ments to ease their transformation into legitimate political parties, in hopes that 
they will become stakeholders in the political system. At the end of Mozambique’s 
civil war, the rebel group Renamo received $19 million from key donors to help 
convert the insurgent organization into a political party. Clearly, the international 
community can contribute significantly to furthering conflict-management ob-
jectives.27
Purchase is widely used and, despite its relatively low cost, can contribute 
significantly to furthering conflict-prevention goals. By themselves, these types of 
incentives are not likely to overcome the commitment problem in intense conflict 
situations, but even here their contribution to conflict management should not be 
dismissed lightly.
Insurance. Outside actors can play important roles by encouraging conflict-
ing parties to adopt and respect inclusive political institutions and minority pro-
tections, as well as to uphold negotiated settlements. As such, insurance incentives 
can help manage conflict by trying to alleviate the fears of disenfranchised groups. 
These measures are frequently offered during the peace-implementation phase in 
an effort to make possible more pacific interactions in the future. External third 
parties can attempt to transform an intrastate dispute by promising protections 
for minorities and safeguarding their participation in the political institutions 
once the peace agreement is implemented. That is to say, third parties from the 
international community may have considerable capacity to reassure minority 
groups through promises of support for regular elections, political autonomy, in-
clusion of weaker interests on a proportional basis in the civil service and central 
government, the rule of law, judicial impartiality, rules on the proportional distri-
bution of revenues, and the protection of linguistic, religious, and ethnic rights.28 
Constitutional and legal protections can offer broad assurance for vulnerable mi-
nority peoples, encouraging their participation in the peace process.
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The problem of insuring the representation of minority interests in new 
postconflict state institutions received considerable attention in Sudan’s North-
South and Darfur peace processes. Sudan’s 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment represents such an effort. Outside actors helped with a number of protec-
tions in this negotiated settlement, including temporary power-sharing 
mechanisms in Khartoum, English and local language usage in the South, and the 
referendum for the independence of the South in 2011, leading to an autonomous 
South Sudan.
Encouraging as such promised guarantees are for minority security and well-
being, there are limits to their efficacy, nonetheless, and the majority party cannot 
credibly commit future leaders to refrain from exploiting smaller parties at a later 
date.29 Additionally, considerable constraints on external actors may exist and 
undermine such incentives. Under pressure from their own domestic constituents 
to reduce overseas involvements (especially ones that they believe might not fit in 
their perceived “national interests”), third parties find it difficult in practice to 
honor fully the “guarantees” they give in order to uphold the agreement.
Legitimation. Perhaps one of the most powerful inducements for peaceful 
relations is the inclusion of a given actor as a part of the international community. 
Acceptance (or nonacceptance in some cases) by other states is a form of soft in-
tervention that affects the credibility of the underlying negotiating process.30 
Third parties can use such legitimacy incentives to induce a target state’s or move-
ment’s cooperation in preventing intense conflict or helping to de-escalate it once 
it has emerged. States and international organizations, in passing judgment on 
other actors’ legitimacy, can affect the reputation of elites and their ability to enter 
into beneficial relations with other members of the international community and 
all of the benefits it entails. This option is a form of what Joseph Nye calls “soft 
power.”31  At its core, legitimation offers the incentive of the inclusion of actors in 
the international community. Furthermore, excluding states or other actors from 
participation or membership in an international organization involves elements of 
delegitimation that can be costly. They are thus willing to take serious steps to 
avoid it.
Legitimacy incentives are also a resource for stabilizing the commitment to 
democratization in the postconflict phase. Reacting to a series of military coups in 
Niger, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau, the Organization of African 
Unity at its Algiers summit in 1999 decided that governments that mounted 
coups against constitutionally established regimes after 1997 would be suspended 
from future summits. The organization subsequently prevented the postcoup 
military governments of Côte d’Ivoire and Comoros from attending the Lomé 
summit in 2000.32 Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States 
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demanded that Togo return to constitutionality following the attempted transfer 
of power from the late president, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, to his son in February 
2005.
Given such possibilities for international action, on the one hand it seems 
clear that legitimacy incentives represent a noncoercive means of considerable 
potential importance in various contexts, such as in the area of conflict prevention 
and de-escalation. On the other hand, the exclusion of a state from full participa-
tion or membership in an international organization involves elements of dele-
gitimation that can be costly in terms of access and support from donors and 
potential investors. As a consequence, states are willing to take serious measures 
to avoid a loss of international standing. The readiness of international organiza-
tions to hold out the prospect of inclusion or exclusion is clearly a powerful tool 
at their disposal.
Economic support. For more than a decade now, a growing body of scholar-
ship has offered empirical support for the conclusion that the occurrence of civil 
war is closely related to unequal incomes and low average income in a given coun-
try.33 In agreement with this finding, James Fearon and David Laitin’s data indi-
cate that countries with lower per capita incomes tend to be strongly related to a 
higher propensity for civil war in the period following 1945.34 Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the prospect of donor economic support seems likely to increase the 
size of the available pie, holding out the likelihood that increased economic op-
portunity for all will enhance mutual cooperation and lower the probability of 
future warfare. It seems clear that when a society and its elites anticipate gains 
from cooperation and bargaining, they should be more readily prepared to work 
through potential crises and try to build a more prosperous future. Using aid as 
incentive, therefore, can hold promise for peace.35
Development aid can be especially useful in the early stages of conflict before 
widespread violence takes hold. Donor funds can help overcome societal stresses 
and group grievances that may lead to war by reconstructing the economy and 
redistributing the benefits of economic growth. Additionally, economic assistance 
can be critical in the postconflict phase, helping ease tensions and avoid a recur-
rence of violence.36 Further, recent research does in fact indicate that in the sample 
of African cases in which international donors gave sustained developmental as-
sistance after the signing of a peace agreement, the majority did not return to war 
within five years.37 However, when assistance was not sustained or decreased, the 
chances of a return to civil war increased noticeably. Given this empirical reality, 
it is not surprising that promises of economic assistance can be perceived as a 
chance for increased economic opportunities for all communities in a given con-
flict. Note that such economic support packages are not personalistic, like the 
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purchase option; instead, donor economic aid is offered to assist the wider national 
community with the hope of reconciliation and development. The promise of aid 
(which includes bilateral, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund eco-
nomic assistance; expenditures on infrastructure; debt restructuring and forgive-
ness; etc.) represents a future peace dividend offered to parties to induce them to 
overcome their differences and agree on joint problem-solving approaches. The 
adversaries have an incentive to agree to peace and thus gain the benefits that 
follow from ending the uncertainty of protracted war and creating new possibili-
ties for economic development.38
The 1979 Lancaster House conference on Zimbabwean Independence 
stands as a striking example of the impact that donor economic assistance can 
have on a peace process. Key donors, mainly the United Kingdom and the United 
States, both coordinated their efforts and made important financial pledges to 
induce the parties to reach an accommodation. Here, incentives in the form of 
developmental assistance proved critical in the negotiations, which sought to cul-
tivate the ripening process and an eventual negotiated settlement.
Coercive Incentive Strategies
In addition to the above-mentioned noncoercive incentives, it is important to 
note that three partially or fully coercive incentives are available for employment 
by third parties for the purposes of conflict management. Despite their coercive 
features, one should treat them as incentives for cooperation since external actors 
use coercive measures to change the calculations of costs and benefits of local 
parties and encourage them to alter policies accordingly.39 This inclusion of pri-
marily coercive actions among the corpus of incentive strategies is different from 
the narrower approach adopted by some scholars but seems justified in terms of 
the purposes of the sending actor(s) and how they go about achieving them. These 
approaches include diplomatic pressure, sanctions, and military intervention.
Diplomatic pressure. Diplomats frequently act in a preventive manner by 
raising awareness of the potential future costs of escalating conflict. They attempt 
to alter the perceptions of the warring parties, shifting them to more accommo-
dating positions. Effective communication of the possibly negative impact of 
continuing conflict-prone behavior is crucial to the success of this strategy. How-
ever, diplomats need leverage on the parties and the interests involved to be able 
to press for a more peaceful situation. Stern warnings alone are frequently not 
enough to facilitate bargaining and an end to violent conflict. To build this lever-
age, diplomatic efforts are often combined with other incentives. Some of the 
most effective courses of action include offering economic assistance or warning 
about an imminent cutoff of aid, as well as threatening to invoke or offering to 
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remove sanctions, and deciding on the inclusion or exclusion of a target state from 
an international organization. US leverage in the negotiations to end the Suda-
nese North-South conflict concentrated mostly on diplomatic incentives, com-
bined with pressure to increase the sanctions regime if Khartoum did not comply 
and the promise to reduce sanctions if it did. Overall, the mediators frequently use 
this leverage to ripen the situation, convincing the warring parties that they had 
indeed reached a mutually hurting stalemate and needed to find a negotiated 
settlement.
In the 2003 Machakos negotiations concerning the lengthy and brutal Su-
dan North/South conflict, US secretary of state Powell referred to the mutual 
exhaustion of all parts in the war.40 He explained that two decades of war could 
be ended and that a third party like the United States and others in the interna-
tional community could help them push towards peace. By that time, mediators 
perceived and pushed the concept of the presence of a mutual hurting stalemate 
in Sudan. After decades of fighting, the North was thought to have become war 
weary and was not able to obtain and keep the upper hand in the conflict. Khar-
toum could control the vital oil fields in the South in the dry season, but when the 
rains of the wet season arrived, it had great difficulty doing so. Southern forces, 
though, appeared less fatigued by the conflict, but they too did not know how to 
escape the back-and-forth fighting that was so closely influenced by the weather 
and seasons. Mediators used this reality to push the idea of a hurting stalemate to 
move the negotiations forward. Once the mediators realized that a ripe moment 
was at hand in Sudan, US diplomats acted to further the mediation process by 
attempting to use its leverage on the regime of Omar al-Bashir in Khartoum. In 
doing so, the Bush administration removed Sudan from its list of countries con-
sidered uncooperative in the fight against terrorism and held out the possibility of 
lifting the broad-based US economic sanctions. It felt that these issues would 
prove helpful in building sufficient leverage on the Sudanese leaders to push them 
towards a negotiated peace settlement with the South.41
In this period, the United States had leverage with the parties in the Suda-
nese negotiations, enabling it to play a constructive role in influencing the priori-
ties of these rivals. The International Crisis Group deemed that “sustained U.S. 
pressure on the parties is the single most important factor needed” in the Sudanese 
negotiations during the Machakos talks.42 Clearly, so that diplomatic pressures 
can work, mediators use their leverage over the parties involved in the conflict. In 
the above-mentioned case of Sudan, the mediator helped bring the parties into an 
agreement based on what I. William Zartman calls a “mutually enticing opportu-
nity.”43 When such a violent conflict is intense and third-party influence is needed, 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA  25
a mediator requires the capacity to raise the costs of proceeding with a given 
course of action.44
Sanctions. Sanctions (such as aid conditionality, targeted individual sanc-
tions, economic sanctions, etc.) are certainly an important resource for conflict 
management, but they call for careful application if they are to have the desired 
effect. The threat or actual imposition of a wide variety of sanctions on a target 
state or movement represents an important coercive incentive strategy. Sanctions 
are designed to alter the behavior of combatants in a desired direction, in this case 
towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict. These actions seek to punish those 
who violate widely held international norms and to provide incentives for coop-
eration if behavior changes. Additionally, sanctions have an important symbolic 
dimension, for they indicate the international community’s displeasure with the 
target’s present behavior. This second aspect of sanctions is frequently underesti-
mated. That is to say, if one views the impact of sanctions broadly and includes the 
psychological and symbolic effects they have on the bargaining environment, then 
it is critical to stress their potential contribution on peace negotiations as well—
take for example the US Congress’s enactment of the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act. 
Incentives with South Africa advanced the interests of the sender—here the 
United States—without immersing it in a military intervention. In the case of 
South Africa, Washington proved that a realistic and relatively low-cost means of 
exerting influence could encourage the principal actors in the targeted country to 
alter their behavior and agree to new common institutions and norms.
Yet, it is important to note that sanctions are widely viewed by many people 
as rather ineffective tools. Frequently, broad-based economic sanctions have a 
problem targeting the precise groups deemed responsible for the offensive behav-
ior.45 Sanctions also have not historically proven to be relevant coercive instru-
ments with authoritarian regimes or weak states, or those with a certain level of 
autonomy from the sender’s, or more generally the international community’s 
influence. Sanctions, then, require careful application if they are to provide an 
incentive for change.
Nonetheless, sanctions can be considerably strengthened when applied in a 
multilateral manner with demands for change that are limited in scope and with 
targeted states that have clear links to the global economy. Sanctions represent an 
important coercive incentive strategy for conflict management, but they demand 
careful application if they are to have the desired effect. Powerful states are in an 
advantageous position “to exert influence to persuade the disputants to change 
their stance and agree to terms they are reluctant to accept.”46 Their leverage al-
lows them to persuade and pressure the adversaries to adopt more cooperative 
positions on the issues that divide them.47
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Military intervention. When noncoercive and minimally coercive incen-
tives fail to prevent conflict from emerging or escalating, third parties may have 
little option other than raising the costs and threatening or using military force. 
Such actions should be viewed as a last resort to enforce peace and protect vulner-
able populations. Yet, the threat or actual deployment of military power may at 
times prove indispensable to de-escalate a dangerous situation and to further le-
gitimate objectives. Under the proper conditions, military intervention by a rela-
tively benign third party can play a constructive role and can supply pressures and 
incentives to alter the conflict trajectory, facilitate bargaining, and protect the 
safety of vulnerable peoples.48 Provided their troops are sufficient in number to 
achieve their purposes and are well trained and armed, third-party military ac-
tions or the threat of such actions may be indispensable in strengthening a politi-
cal initiative.49 When the key international actors or the international community 
as a whole is either unable or unwilling to use force to help stop such horrific 
situations as the Rwandan genocide, the consequences can be disastrous. Remark-
ably, these military interventions do not need to be large. The relatively small 
British force that deployed in Sierra Leone in 2000 was sufficient to rescue United 
Nations peacekeepers taken hostage and put the peace process back on track. As 
with this case and the example of the French military intervention in Cote d’Ivoire 
in 2002, although military force may be the last resort, its threat or actual use can 
prove crucial to further legitimate diplomatic objectives.
Beyond protecting vulnerable populations, military enforcement can be an 
important element in overcoming the credible-commitment problem and infor-
mation issues that frequently undermine peace processes.50 In addition to moni-
toring the actions of adversaries and providing information, the third party’s use 
of military enforcement can actually further buttress a peace process by raising the 
costs of attempting to break the new bargain. Supporting this conclusion, Barbara 
Walter finds that parties in a peace process are 20 percent more likely to follow 
through on an agreement if a third party intervenes as a protector of the agree-
ment.51 Thus, third parties are likely to play a critically important role in overcom-
ing uncertainties surrounding the consolidation process, providing much-needed 
support to the state, and raising the costs for potential challengers.52
Obviously, military force can at times be helpful in third-party attempts to 
manage conflict. It may be able to protect at-risk populations from massive hu-
man rights abuses or genocide, as in the case of Rwanda or Darfur. However, war 
appears to be changing in the twenty-first century, in Africa and elsewhere, as 
militia groups replace regular armies on the battlefield. Readily available modern 
technology and guerilla tactics combine, making military intervention and peace 
enforcement and peacekeeping difficult for conventional armed forces.53 The con-
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flicts in Somalia and Mali underscore this concept. In such situations, the very 
notion of victory may have lost some of its meaning, as irregular forces simply 
avoid surrender and melt into their communities until another opportunity pres-
ents itself. Moreover, external military force may even prove counterproductive 
and bring about a nationalist rally-around-the-flag effect, undermining the third 
parties’ efforts. Clearly, military intervention in many of today’s conflicts is a deli-
cate task, especially while trying to protect at-risk peoples, remaining unbiased, 
and either helping the parties involved reach an agreement or assisting them in 
the implementation of one.
Conclusion
A wide variety of incentive strategies is available for third parties to use in an 
attempt to manage conflict in Africa and beyond. Nonetheless, external actors do 
not always consider the full range of options. The above-mentioned incentive 
strategies can give interveners leverage and aid them in efforts to mediate and 
hopefully manage deadly conflict. This leverage is frequently diplomatic in nature, 
not simply military, providing an advantageous basis for soft intervention in con-
flicts, especially when the extremes of withdrawal and military intervention are 
inappropriate and may even be counterproductive. The problem is that these non-
coercive incentives may not raise the costs of noncompliance sufficiently. Hence, 
as the previous discussions of economic sanctions and military enforcement sug-
gest, it is necessary at times to link diplomacy with the threat or use of force to 
produce breakthroughs in the negotiation process. Regardless, evidence points to 
the fact that African elites as well as scholars, policy makers, and the public in the 
sender and target countries generally prefer noncoercive incentives to their coer-
cive counterparts because the sting of external imposition is less apparent and 
because the resulting bargain has a voluntary quality about it. Following on these 
realities, future research on this topic should examine the critical issues of (1) the 
proper timing of the deployment of various incentives and (2) the packages of 
incentives that have been used successfully to encourage bargaining and resolve 
conflict.
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